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YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO: AT THE
CROSSROADS OF THE "UNREASONABLE
APPLICATION" PROVISION OF THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1996 AND THE
CONSIDERATION OF JUVENILE STATUS
IN CUSTODIAL DETERMINATIONS
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Yarborough v. Alvarado,1 the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Ninth Circuit, finding that the California Court of Appeals had not
unreasonably failed to extend Supreme Court precedent in refusing to
include juvenile age and experience as factors in the determination of
whether Michael Alvarado was in police custody for Miranda purposes.2
Procedurally, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in its
-grant of habeas relief, as the non-consideration of Alvarado's underage
status and lack of experience in determining custody was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.3 The Court has
considered these two factors in the past, but only in the realm of
confessions and in the assessment of defendants' voluntary waivers of their
privilege to avoid self-incrimination. Never had juvenile status as a factor
in custodial determinations been addressed by the Supreme Court . Thus,
given the absence of Supreme Court precedent in this area, the state court's
refusal to extend the custodial determination standard to include age and
prior experience was not an unreasonable application of federal law,
thereby leaving Michael Alvarado without any grounds for relief under 28
1 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
2 Id. at 2149.
' Id. at 2150.
4 Id. at 2151.
5Id.
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U.S.C. § 2254(d).6 Substantively, setting aside the procedural issue of
Supreme Court precedent, the Court again determined that prior history
with law enforcement and age should not be factors in the objective
determination of whether a juvenile was "in custody" for Miranda
purposes, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
This Note, in agreement with the Supreme Court's decision, argues
that the California state court was within the limits of habeas corpus
jurisprudence in refusing to broaden existing Supreme Court precedent
dealing with custodial determinations, and that the state's refusal was not
objectively unreasonable. Under the confines of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),8 the state court did not err
in choosing not to consider Alvarado's age and lack of prior criminal
history. Since these two factors are of a material nature, it was under the
purview of the Supreme Court to determine whether or not these two
factors should have been included, and not any other court.
However, this Note also criticizes the Supreme Court's ultimate
conclusion that juvenile status should not be a consideration in the objective
determination of whether an individual is "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda. The immaturity of adolescents and their lesser ability to make
decisions compared to adults has been the impetus behind many social
policies and Supreme Court precedent in treating juveniles according to a
different standard than adults. Thus with custodial determinations, it would
be wrong to apply the same criteria to both adults and minors, and to judge
minors against a reasonable person standard that was developed with a
reasonable adult in mind. The consideration of age would not damage the
objective nature of the standard used to determine a suspect's custodial
status, as the characteristics of youth are neither unique nor hard to
discover.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
1. The Attempt to Reform Habeas Corpus Through the AEDPA
Habeas corpus proceedings, though important in assuring that a
petitioner's constitutional rights are preserved, are not meant to serve as
6 Id. at 2152.
7id.
8 Pub. L. 104-106, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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opportunities for claims to be relitigated in the forum of the federal courts.9
Historically, the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as a means for
redress for convictions that violate fundamental fairness'0 and for those who
have been grievously wronged.1' Courts have shown restraint in allowing
the use of habeas corpus petitions by imposing exhaustion requirements, 2
limiting a prisoner's ability to make successive claims,' 3 and disallowing
retroactive application of new constitutional rules.14 The purpose of these
restrictions has been to prevent the relitigation of claims on collateral
review and to prevent the degradation of the trial process.' 5 Further, there is
an interest in upholding the finality of convictions and honoring the courts'
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. 16  Limitations by the
courts also preserve the scarce resources of the judiciary and save society
from footing the burdensome costs associated with allowing habeas corpus
petitions to run rampant within the court system.'
7
Despite attempts by the court to prevent the abuse of this writ, decades
of habeas rulings unavoidably led to a tangled and unmanageable morass of
procedural rules, frictions between federal and state court systems, and
increasing costs on the judicial system and society alike.'8 The AEDPA
was the result of an effort to reform habeas, and extensively revised the law
of habeas corpus as practiced within the federal judicial system. 19 Through
this change, Congress hoped to curb delays, avoid retrials on federal
habeas, and give effect to judgments made by state courts to the greatest
extent possible under the law.20
9 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 887 (1983)).
10 Id. at 633-34 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982)).
"1 Id. at 634 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-41 (1963)).
12 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that a state claimant must show
cause as to why his claim was never raised in state court under direct review and must
demonstrate that he suffered from actual prejudice due to the denial of that claim).
'3 See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that a state claimant must show
cause as to why the additional federal claims were never raised in the first petition and must
demonstrate that he suffered from actual prejudice due to the denial of that claim).
14 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (noting that new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are not to be applied retroactively unless they involve a fundamental
right).
15 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
16 Id.
17 See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
18 Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 485, 530 (1995).
'9 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
20 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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Section 2254(d)(1), through provisions of the AEDPA that limit a
federal court's authority to grant habeas writs on behalf of persons in state
custody, deals exclusively with the circumstances under which a federal
court should grant a state petitioner's habeas application. 21 This section is
critical as it serves a gatekeeper function for federal habeas review of state
court judgments, by constraining a federal court's jurisdictional authority to
three specified standards of review. 22  At the core of the AEDPA lies
provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which state:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
2 3
A practical effect of the AEDPA was to impose stringent restrictions
on habeas corpus petitioners and to codify the standards of review to be
used by federal courts, through sweeping changes in habeas corpus
jurisprudence.24 Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, classifying the
question at issue as one of fact or as one of both law and fact, was essential
in federal habeas proceedings because those two types of questions called
for strikingly different standards of review.25 Mixed questions of fact and
law were generally reviewed de novo, while state decisions on mere
questions of fact were presumed to be correct.26  But post-AEDPA, a
federal court generally would not disturb a state court's reasonable ruling,
even if it would have decided the issue differently on de novo review on
both mixed questions and questions of fact.27 As a result, the AEDPA
effectively reigned in those courts with the tendency to expand the rights of
21 Jude Obasi Nkama, Note, The Great Writ Encumbered by Great Limitations: Is the
Third Circuit's Notice Requirement for Habeas Relief a Structural Bias Against "Persons in
Custody?", 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 202 (2001).
22 Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 29 US.C. § 2254(d)(1): A
Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 677,
679 (2003).
23 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2001).
24 Nkama, supra note 21, at 200.
25 Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably
Erroneous"Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 735-36 (2002).
26 Id. at 736.
27 Id. at 739.
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habeas petitioners, and left the development of the law in the hands of the
Supreme Court.28
2. Interpreting the AEDPA s Effect on Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence in
Williams v. Taylor
Although the purpose of the AEDPA's changes to habeas corpus
jurisprudence was to clarify the habeas process, the standard of review
enacted by the AEDPA was not clear-cut and led many to wonder the extent
of the AEDPA's reach.29 Courts struggled to interpret correctly provisions
of the AEDPA, but had particular difficulty determining how much
deference federal courts should have of state court adjudications in view of
§ 2254(d)(1).3° Since its inception, most cases decided by the Supreme
Court concerning this seemingly innocuous subsection provided little or no
meaningful interpretation of the newly changed statute.31  The Supreme
Court's first critical interpretation of the AEDPA was in Williams v.
Taylor.32 Still, the Supreme Court's Williams decision left many important
questions unanswered and left an incoherent pattern of precedent, leaving
the lower courts to fend for themselves in interpreting the meaning of §
2254(d), particularly those questions related to the scope of the
"unreasonable application" standard.
33
Justice O'Connor, in writing for the majority34 in Williams v. Taylor,
expanded the language of § 2254(d)(1) and established that the AEDPA
,called for a deferential standard of review for habeas jurisprudence.35
According to the decision, federal courts could grant habeas petitions and
set aside state court judgments only if the decision is "contrary to"
controlling Supreme Court precedent or if the state court's decision
involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent.36 A
state court determination can be found to be "contrary to" the Supreme
Court's established precedent under two conditions.37 The first instance is
when the state court arrives at a conclusion contradictory to that reached by
28 Ides, supra note 22, at 684.
29 Pettys, supra note 25, at 746.
30 Nkama, supra note 21, at 202.
31 See Ides, supra note 22, at 680.
32 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
33 Ides, supra note 22, at 718.
34 Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Scalia (except as to the footnote).
3' 529 U.S. at 399-419.
36 Id. at 404-13.
37 Id. at 404-05.
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the Supreme Court on a question of law.38 The second occasion is when the
state court is confronted with facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a relevant Supreme Court precedent, yet arrives at a result opposite to
that reached by the Supreme Court.39
Similarly, instances of when a state decision involves an
"unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law are also
twofold. The first condition is when a state court correctly identifies the
governing legal rule, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the case
before them.40 The alternative circumstance would be when a state court
unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not
apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply.4'
But in its decision, the Court also recognized that the "unreasonable
application" classification can be problematic, especially in the instance of
a failure to extend existing established precedent or an inappropriate
extension of such.4 z Distinguishing what is and is not a reasonable
extension (or a refusal to do so) is an inherently difficult task that may
never be clear.43 Though acknowledging the difficulty in making this
distinction, the Court did nothing further. Rather, the Court avoided
deciding how cases dealing with extensions of legal principle should be
treated under § 2254(d)(1), as that question was not yet before the Court.44
In the judgment of the Williams Court, the "reasonable jurist" standard
of determining unreasonable applications was too subjective.4 5 The belief
was that the test should remain objective and that the standard should
require the Court to find that the application of precedent was "objectively
unreasonable. 46  Justice O'Connor also stressed that an unreasonable
application is different from an incorrect application of federal law.4 7 A
federal court cannot arbitrarily issue a habeas writ because it decides in its
independent judgment that the state court simply applied the federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.48  Rather, the application must also be
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 407.
41 id
42 Id. at 408.
43 Id. at 408-09.
44 Id
41 Id at 409.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 412.
48 Id. at 411-12.
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unreasonable.49  Thus, based on the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation of the AEDPA and its legislative history, federal courts must
give some deference to the determinations of state courts, so long as it does
not involve an unreasonable application or is not contrary to clearly
established federal law.50
Justice Stevens,51 writing for the plurality in Williams, warned lower
courts against establishing legal principles in areas where the Court has not
"broken sufficient legal ground to establish an asked-for constitutional
principle," since those principles would not survive the bar of review set by
the AEDPA.52 By definition, ground breaking legal rules or legal rules that
impose new obligations on states or the federal government fall outside the
universe of clearly established federal law, defined as precedent existing at
the time of the defendant's conviction.53 In situations where the Supreme
Court has set a strict and specific rule of application as precedent, the lower
courts must closely follow that directive and are without opportunity to
stray very far. 4 However, it is rare for a legal principle to be applicable
only to one set of circumstances, as legal principles are generally broad in
scope and grant state courts latitude in the interpretation of the law.
Although the AEDPA was intended to establish strict and clear
standards of review regarding habeas matters, it was somewhat
unsuccessful in doing so. Questions and uncertainties arose with the
AEDPA's passage, especially concerning the "unreasonable application"
provision it enacted. However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams, the prevailing understanding seems to be that with a greater level
of generality of the controlling legal standard, a court's discretion
correspondingly increases.
B. "IN CUSTODY" DETERMINATIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF MIRANDA
The debate surrounding statements and confessions made during
police interrogations had its beginnings in the Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Miranda v. Arizona 56 that mandated a warning and waiver
49 id.
50 Id. at 386. Justice O'Connor clearly defines clearly established law as "holdings, as
opposed to dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court
decision." Id. at 412.
51 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer with respect to
Parts II and V.
52 Williams, 529 U.S. at 381.
53 Id.
54 Pettys, supra note 25, at 777.
15 Williams, 529 U.S. at 382.
56 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2005]
SUPREME COURTREVIEW
system based on the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 57
The Miranda Court held that prior to custodial questioning, suspects must
be warned that they have a right to remain silent, that any statement they
make may be used as evidence against them, and that they have a right to
the presence of an attorney-retained or appointed by the state free of
charge-to advise them before or during the interrogation.58 But the Court
maintained that notification of these constitutional protections is required
only during custodial interrogations.5 9 A custodial interrogation, as defined
by the Miranda Court, is questioning by law enforcement officers once an
individual has been taken into custody or has been significantly deprived of
the freedom of action.
60
Custodial interrogations are the trigger for the notification of Miranda
rights, as they are by nature intrinsically hostile to autonomous decision-
making by a suspect.61 The Court recognized that custodial interrogations
inevitably create the pressure to speak-a pressure that may induce
individuals to make statements they might not have otherwise made.62
Moreover, the Court reasoned that custodial interrogations exact a heavy
burden on individual liberty and take advantage of the weakness of
individuals.63
The establishment of custodial interrogations as the point for requiring
the notification of Miranda rights resulted in a flurry of litigation
demanding a more closely circumscribed clarification as to what
circumstances satisfied "in custody" status for the purposes of Miranda.64
In Oregon v. Mathiason,65 the Supreme Court decided that the petitioner
was not in custody after taking into account that the suspect went to the
police station voluntarily, was immediately told that he was not under
arrest, was allowed to leave, was only interviewed for thirty minutes, and
was interviewed in a closed but unlocked room. 66 Interviews conducted by
57 Id. at 494.
" Id. at 444.
59 id.
60 id.
61 Id. at 458.
62 Id. at 455-56.
63 Id. The Supreme Court based its opinion that interrogations were potentially coercive
on police interrogation manuals that detailed the psychologically oppressive tactics used to
question suspects. Id. at 447-55.
64 William F. Nagel, The Difference Between the US. Supreme Court and the Colorado
Supreme Court on the Test for the Determination of Custody for Purposes of Miranda, 71
DENV. U. L. REv. 427, 429 (1993).
65 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
66 Id. at 493.
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law enforcement officials embody a degree of coerciveness. Yet, the
Mathiason Court still held that being considered a suspect or simply being
present at a police station in itself is not coercive enough to warrant the
notification of constitutional protections.67  Rather, a true coercive
environment that merits the recitation of Miranda rights is one where the
individual's freedom to depart or where his freedom of action is restricted
in any significant way.68 Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that because
the suspect had been interrogated in private and in unfamiliar surroundings,
factors on which Miranda had placed great emphasis. Therefore, the
environment was coercive enough to merit Miranda-type warnings.
69
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Mathiason holding in California v.
Beheler.70 The Beheler Court found that the respondent was not in custody
at the time he was interrogated by law enforcement officials based on the
facts that: he had come to the police station voluntarily; he was told he was
not under arrest; the interview lasted under thirty minutes; he was allowed
to go home; and he was arrested five days later.71 According to the Court,
the ultimate inquiry is whether there has been "a formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.,
72
Further adding to the Mathiason decision, the Court stated that the time
between the commission of the crime and when the individual is questioned
is irrelevant as a factor for the purpose of Miranda warnings.73
This "in custody" standard was applied in a new context in Berkemer
v. McCarty,74 with the Supreme Court finding that traffic stops are not
custodial in nature and therefore not subject to Miranda.7 Although one's
freedom is curtailed if detained, the Court found that there were numerous
mitigating factors that render traffic stops to be of a non-custodial nature.76
Traffic stops are brief in nature, and detainees are generally aware that they
will soon be able to leave.77 Moreover, traffic stops are usually in public,
non-police dominated settings where usually only one or two police officers
are present. 78  These non-custodial characteristics make the safeguards
67 Id. at 495.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 498 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
"1 Id. at 1122.
72 Id. at 1125.
73 Id.
74 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 436.




prescribed by Miranda moot, as Miranda strives both to ensure that the
police do not coerce captive suspects and to relieve the inherently
compelling pressures created by the custodial setting.79 Importantly, the
Court established that an individual's awareness of restraint by law
enforcement for the purposes of Miranda should be viewed from the
standpoint of a reasonable person in the interrogatee's position.80
Further narrowing the custody standard appropriate in the Miranda
context, the Supreme Court in Stansbury v. California81 held that law
enforcement's consideration of an individual as a suspect is irrelevant,
especially when that suspicion is not disclosed.82 The Stansbury Court held
this to be irrelevant, as it is the "compulsive aspect of custodial
interrogations, and not the strength or content of the government's
suspicions ... which [leads] the Court to impose the Miranda requirements
with regard to custodial questioning. 83 If in the course of events, an
individual discovered that he was a suspect, this revelation shapes custody
determinations only to the extent as to how it would affect a reasonable
person's assessment of his freedom to end the interview or leave.84 A clear
statement that an individual is a prime suspect is not dispositive of the
custody issue, as some suspects are still free to come and go until the police
decide to make an arrest.85 Therefore, courts need to consider the objective
circumstances of the situation in making a custodial determination and not
the subjective suspicions harbored by the police, unless those suspicions
were manifested to the individual under interrogation.
86
Clarifying even further the terrain of custodial determinations, Justice
Ginsberg in her majority opinion in Thompson v. Keohane8 7 explicitly
specified the two essential inquiries that will determine whether a formal
arrest was made or whether there was a restraint on the freedom to leave to
the degree associated with a formal arrest.8 8 First, the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation must be established. 9 Second, given those
circumstances, it must be determined whether a reasonable person would
79 Id. at 432 (quotations omitted).
80 Id.
81 511 U.S. 318 (1994).
82 Id. at 323.
83 Id.
14 Id. at 325.
85 id.
86 Id.
87 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
88 Id. at 112 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
89 Id.
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have felt that they were not at liberty to end the interrogation and leave. 90
Justice Ginsberg repeatedly identified the crucial question to resolve
custodial status as: "if encountered by a reasonable person, would the
identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?"91
In these past decisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized time and
again the need to analyze the totality of the circumstances surrounding an
interrogation. The Supreme Court has consistently considered factors such
as the voluntariness of a suspect's appearance at a police station, and has
utilized the reasonable person standard to ascertain the perceived level of
restraint imposed on the suspect. However, in the history of custodial
determination precedent, the Supreme Court had never dealt with juvenile
suspects, consequently resulting in the development and application of a
custody standard with the adult petitioner in mind.
C. USE OF A JUVENILE'S AGE AS A FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION
The special status of juveniles has been long-established, as indicated
by the creation of the juvenile justice system in the early 1900s and by
Supreme Court precedent recognizing that a number of factors differentiate
minors from adults, namely life experiences and age.92 Haley v. Ohio was
one of the first Supreme Court cases that acknowledged the judicial
necessity and responsibility of courts to distinguish juvenile suspects from
adult suspects, and established the foundation for subsequent Fifth
Amendment cases involving juveniles.93 Prior to Haley, the juvenile court
system did not apply the rules governing the arrest and interrogation of
adults to juveniles, as it was based on the intent to treat and rehabilitate
minors. 94 It was believed that the state, with rights as parens patriae, could
deny juveniles the procedural rights normally available to adults.95
However, this mentality slowly began to change with Haley, where a
fifteen-year old boy was arrested and made a questionable confession after
having been interrogated late at night for five hours without respite and
90 Id.
91 Id. at 113 (internal quotations omitted). See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984) (holding that in resolving custodial status, a court must assess "how a reasonable man
in the suspect's position would have understood his situation") (emphasis added).
92 Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al. at 3, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S.
Ct. 1706 (2004) (No.02-1684). A number of psychosocial factors, such as "present-oriented
thinking, egocentrism, less experience and greater vulnerability to stress and fear than adults,
and greater conformity to authority figures" differentiate juveniles from adults. Id.
9' 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
94 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
9' Id. at 17.
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possibly had been beaten by the police.96 The majority held that the method
in which the confession was obtained was contrary to the due process of
law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and reversed the state
court's admission of the boy's confession.97 According to the Court, a
juvenile could not be held to the more exacting standards of maturity, for
that which would leave an adult unfazed and unimpressed would overawe
and overwhelm an adolescent.98 This was the first instance in which the
Supreme Court determined age to be a critical factor, as youth may cause a
juvenile to be more vulnerable and intimidated than an adult may be in the
same situation.99
A second landmark case for juvenile rights was in In re Gault, when
the Supreme Court invested minors with constitutional protections routinely
afforded to adults by the Fourteenth Amendment. 100 These rights included
the right to counsel, the advance notice of charges, the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.101 But, although juveniles were to be accorded the same
constitutional protections as that of adults, the Court did not mean to
suggest that judges should neglect the emotional and psychological
characteristics of juveniles that differentiate them from adults. 10 2  The
Supreme Court still recognized that juvenile status merited a degree of
increased care.
This recognition of age as a material factor in matters concerning
juveniles continued in Fare v. Michael C. 103 In Fare, the Court held that in
determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's waiver of his Miranda rights,
courts should apply the "totality of circumstances" test. 0 4 This totality test
requires an examination of all the circumstances surrounding an
interrogation, such as the minor's age, experience, schooling, and
intellectual capacity, and whether the juvenile is capable of understanding
his Miranda rights and the ensuing consequences of waiving those rights.
10 5
96 Haley, 332 U.S. at 597-98.
97 Id. at 599.
98 id.
99 See Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda, and Juveniles, 71 U. CON. L. REv. 89, 103 (2002).
"' 387 U.S. at 1.
'o' Id.
102 Id. at 27.
113 442 U.S. 717 (1979).
104 Id. at 725.
105 Id.
[Vol. 95
YARBOROUGH v. AL VARADO
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
On September 22, 1995, seventeen-year-old Michael Alvarado was
involved in an attempted car robbery that ultimately resulted in the murder
of Francisco Castaneda. 10 6 The night of the murder, Alvarado went to a
nearby mall with his friends. 0 7 There, Alvarado met Paul Soto for the first
time. 10 8 Soto suggested that the group steal a truck in the shopping mall's
parking lot, and Alvarado agreed to help him. 109 Approaching Francisco
Castaneda on the driver's side of the truck, Soto pulled out a .357 Magnum
and demanded money and the ignition keys from Castaneda." Meanwhile,
Alvarado walked toward the passenger side and crouched down.' When
Castaneda refused to comply with Soto's demands, Soto' shot him.
112
Castaneda was later found dead from a bullet wound. 13 Alvarado had not
shot the victim, but aided Soto in hiding the murder weapon.'14
Approximately one month later, Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Detective Cheryl Comstock left a message at Alvarado's home, where he
lived with his parents, and also contacted Alvarado's mother at her
workplace. 15 Detective Comstock informed Alvarado's mother that the
police needed to speak to her son."
16
Pursuant to this conversation, Alvarado's parents not only brought
Alvarado to the Sheriffs station, but also gave the detective their
permission to have their son interviewed. 1 7  Alvarado's request that
someone come with him was met with silence; likewise, when Alvarado's
parents requested to attend the questioning, their request was similarly
dismissed by Detective Comstock.1 8 Alvarado's parents were left to wait
in the lobby for two and a half hours. 19 Prior to this incident, Alvarado had










115 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
116 Id.
117 id.




neither a history of criminal acts, nor was he ever questioned by the
police.'
20
Alvarado was led through a locked lobby door, down a hallway, and
into a back interview room containing a table and two chairs. 121 On his way
into the interrogation room, Alvarado overheard a detective refer to him as
a suspect. 122 Prior to the start of his interrogation, Alvarado had not been
informed as to whether he was under arrest or not.' 23 Nor was he ever told
that he had the liberty to leave at any time.124 Rather, it was not until the
near end of his interrogation, after Detective Comstock elicited the
information she wanted from Alvarado, that she gave any indication that
Alvarado was free to leave the police station.1
25
The interview was conducted exclusively by Detective Comstock and
two hours of the interview were recorded on tape.' 26 Upon questioning,
Alvarado initially offered an account of his activities the night Castaneda
was found murdered which did not include any reference to the shooting or
the hiding of the gun.127  Comstock expressed disbelief at Alvarado's
version of events and urged him to tell the "truth" as she knew it from
various witness accounts stating quite the opposite. 28  She repeatedly
assured Alvarado that she was only giving him an opportunity to tell the
truth, and that "she knew he didn't have any intention of anything
happening, and that maybe he wasn't thinking clearly because he had been
drinking.'
129
Alvarado then acknowledged being present when the carjacking took
place, but denied any knowledge as to what exactly happened or who had a
gun.' 30 Comstock then prodded Alvarado further by appealing to his sense
of honesty and the need to bring the man who shot Castaneda to justice. 131
Alvarado then admitted that he had tried to help Soto steal Castaneda's
truck and that he had helped hide the gun after the murder. 32 But Alvarado
also explained to the detective that he had not expected Soto to kill
120 Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2003).




125 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
126 Respondent's Brief at 3, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
127 Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2003).
128 Respondent's Brief at 3, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
129 Id. at 3-4.
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anyone. 133 It was at this point of the interview, after Alvarado had made
these incriminating and non-Mirandized statements that Detective
Comstock offered the use of a phone and asked if Alvarado needed a
break.1 34 When Comstock was finished with her questioning, she escorted
Alvarado back to his parents and told him he was free to leave.
135
Approximately two months later, Detective Comstock notified Alvarado's
parents of the issuance of a warrant for Alvarado's arrest. 136 Alvarado
surrendered to the police the next morning.
137
Prior to his trial, Alvarado moved to exclude evidence of his
statements, arguing that not only should he have been interviewed in his
parents' presence, but that since his interview was of a custodial nature, he
should have been advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda.
138
However, his motion was denied by the trial court after a hearing on the
issue.139 An edited tape of Alvarado's statements was played at trial and
Alvarado took the witness stand in his defense.140 Alvarado was convicted
of first degree murder and attempted robbery, but on trial counsel's motion,
the Superior Court reduced the conviction to second degree murder.
14
'
Alvarado was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life.142
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alvarado appealed his convictions, once again arguing that his
statements to Detective Comstock should have been excluded because he
was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of his
Miranda rights. 143 The California Court of Appeals relied on the custody
test established in Thompson v. Keohane,144 which requires a court to
consider first the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and then to
determine whether a reasonable person in the petitioner's situation would
have felt at liberty to leave. 145 The state court concluded that Alvarado was
133 id.
1s4 Respondent's Brief at 4, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
135 Id. at 5.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
139 Appellee's Brief at 6, Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 00-
56770).
140 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
141 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2146 (2004).
142 Id.
143 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
144 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
145 Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2146.
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not in custody during his interview and thus Miranda warnings were
unwarranted, thereby dismissing Alvarado's claim. 46  The California
Supreme Court denied Alvarado's petition for review.1
47
Alvarado filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California in March 2000, again alleging that his statements were obtained
in violation of Miranda.148 The district court denied Alvarado's petition
with prejudice. 49 The district court found Alvarado's statements to have
been properly admitted, since he was not in custody at the time of his
interrogation and that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave
during the interrogation. 150 The district court also held that the California
court's rejection of Alvarado's earlier claim precluded relief under §
2254(d) since the state court ruling was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court. 151  Alvarado's request for a certificate of appealability was
subsequently denied.
152
Faced with the rejection of his petition by the district court, Alvarado
once again appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Alvarado's certificate of appealability with respect to the issue of whether
Alvarado's statements were indeed properly admitted.153 It reversed the
decision of the lower court, holding that juvenile status and lack of
experience with law enforcement alters the "in custody" determination for
Miranda purposes and therefore should have been taken into account by the
state courts. 54 The Ninth Circuit determined that it was unreasonable to
conclude that a reasonable seventeen-year-old, with no prior history of
arrest or police interviews, would have felt at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.' 55 Coupled with other factors such as parental
involvement in arranging for Alvarado's interview, Detective Comstock's
refusal to allow Alvarado's parents attend the interview, and the length of
146 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
147 Id. at 5.
141 Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2146; Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.
2003).
149 Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 845.
150 Id.
151 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
152 Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 845.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 844.
155 Id. at 851.
[Vol. 95
YARBOROUGH v. AL VARADO
the interview, the court of appeals found that Alvarado had been in custody
of the police and thus should have been read his Miranda rights. 1
56
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that no previous Supreme Court had
required a juvenile's age and experience to be considered in a custody
determination. 157 But, previous Supreme Court precedent had also held
juveniles to be more susceptible to police coercion during custodial
interrogations than similarly-situated adults. 58 The Ninth Circuit used this
precedent to justify the use of age and circumstances of a juvenile defendant
as relevant factors in determining whether a confession or a waiver of
constitutional rights was voluntarily given.159 Extrapolating this line of
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit found no reason why similar safeguards should
not and would not apply to an "in custody" determination. 160
The court of appeals also tackled the issue of whether Alvarado could
obtain relief in light of the deference a federal court must give to a state
court determination on habeas review.'61 On this issue, the Ninth Circuit
held that relief was available despite § 2254(d), because the state court's
failure to address how Alvarado's juvenile status affected the "in custody"
determination was an unreasonable failure to extend a clearly established
legal principle to a new context.' 62 According to the Ninth Circuit, the
relevance of juvenile status in Supreme Court case law as a whole should
have compelled the extension of the principle that juvenile status is relevant
to the context of Miranda custody determinations.
63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine two issues: whether
a court must consider the age and experience of a juvenile when applying
the objective custody determination test for Miranda purposes, and whether
a state court's refusal to "extend" the rule of Supreme Court precedent to a
new context suffices as an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).' 64
156 Id. at 847-49.
157 Id. at 843 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599-601(1948)).
151 Id. at 848.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 843.
161 Id. at 851-52.
162 Id. at 853.
163 Id.
'64 Id. at 841.
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 165 held that the state
appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established law, and that
a juvenile's age and prior history with law enforcement should not be
factors in an objective determination of whether a suspect is in custody for
Miranda purposes. 166 The majority's first step in its reversal of the decision
of the Ninth Circuit was to determine the relevant clearly established law,
defined as Supreme Court holdings at the time of the pertinent state court
ruling.167 In trying to decipher the precise test at issue, the majority detailed
the history of the changes in the law, from Miranda's definition of custodial
interrogation as circumstances where freedom of action has been deprived
in a significant way, 168 to Thompson v. Keohane's establishment of the two-
part custody test as whether "there was a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
169
According to the majority, determining whether a person is "in custody" for
the purposes of Miranda is a clear and established objective test.170 The
established custody test requires an evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, and then an inquiry of whether a reasonable
person would have felt at liberty to end the interrogation and leave.
171
Addressing the procedural issue of whether there was an unreasonable
failure to extend Supreme Court precedent in excluding age and experience
in Alvarado's custodial determination, the Court found that the word
"unreasonable," for the purposes of evaluating a court's application of a
federal law, depended in part on the specificity of the relevant legal rule.
172
Thus, the more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
outcomes in case-by-case determinations. 73 Given that the custody test is a
general one and demands a degree of discretion, the range of reasonable
(and thus acceptable) applications is wide and varied.17 4 This is especially
165 Justice Kennedy's majority was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
166 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
167 Id. at 2147 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
161 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
169 Id. at 2149 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995)).
170 Id. at 2151.
171 Id.





true with age and experience as factors, since previous applications of the
Miranda custody determination test by the Supreme Court never mentioned
or mandated the consideration of a juvenile defendant's age or
experience.
175
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that certain aspects of Alvarado's case
made the determination of whether Alvarado was actually in custody
difficult to ascertain, but the Court ultimately determined that the state
court's application of the Supreme Court's existing custody standard was
reasonable. 176 Given the general nature of the custody test and the absence
of a requirement to consider age and prior history in custodial determination
precedent, the state court's application of existing federal law fit within the
matrix of prior Supreme Court decisions. 177 The majority found that in
determining that Alvarado was not in custody, the state court adjudication
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and
that the Ninth Circuit's extension of Supreme Court precedent in this
situation was wholly inappropriate. 178 The Court reasoned that allowing
habeas courts to introduce rules not clearly established under the guise of
"extensions" would undermine § 2254(d). 179
In its judgment that a juvenile's age should not serve as a factor in the
determination of whether that juvenile is in the custody of law enforcement
officials, the majority delineated a conceptual difference between the
Miranda custody test and the line of Supreme Court cases that considered
age and experience in its determinations. 180 The majority argued that the
Miranda custody test is an objective test designed to provide clear guidance
to the police, and the introduction of age and experience into a police
officer's analysis would only serve to muddy the clarity of Miranda's
rule.
181
Justice Kennedy believed that inserting age and experience
considerations into the mix would render the analysis by police officers
highly speculative and overly burdensome. 182  One argument was that
police officers often will not know a suspect's interrogation history going
into an interview room.183 Moreover, Justice Kennedy argued that even if
175 Id. at 2151.
176 Id at 2150.
177 Id.





183 Id. at 2152.
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the suspect's past history were known, there is no guarantee as to how those
experiences will play into the suspect's perception of his ability to leave the
interrogation at will.184 Trying to decipher how a suspect's past experiences
will play into his reaction during the current interrogation would require the
police to make speculative judgments, which is not the intent of the
Miranda custody test.185 Such an inquiry turns too much on the individual's
subjective state of mind and not enough on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation. 186  The objective Miranda custody determination
therefore is arguably different from the doctrinal tests that depend on a




In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor furnished another reason to
support the reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision. 188 Justice O'Connor
conceded that there are instances where a suspect's age may be relevant to a
Miranda custody inquiry. 189 However, she did not believe Alvarado's case
was such a situation, as he had been nearly eighteen years of age at the time
of his interrogation. 190 Thus, Alvarado's close proximity to adulthood
would make it difficult for police to discern whether Alvarado was even a
juvenile. 191
Justice O'Connor also stated that even if the police were aware of a
suspect's age, there would still be problems in trying to ascertain what
bearing age has on the likelihood that the suspect would feel free to
leave.' 92 Especially in the present case, with a subject five months short of
his eighteenth birthday, his reaction to police questioning could vary widely




117 Id. at 2151.
188 Id. at 2152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, 194 stated that the
circumstances surrounding Alvarado's interrogation clearly established that
Alvarado was "in custody" when he was questioned by the police. 195 The
dissent agreed with the Ninth Circuit's assessment that the state courts had
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. 9
6
Given the circumstances of having been brought to the police station
by his parents at the request of the police, having his request for his parents
to attend the interview denied, being led into a small interrogation room,
being questioned for at least two hours, and being confronted with claims
that there was strong evidence of his participation in a murder, no
reasonable person would have believed that he was free to pick up and
leave in the middle of the questioning.' 97 The facts of this case would lend
themselves to a finding of custody, especially since Alvarado himself never
directly volunteered to appear at the police station or to participate in this
questioning. 198  In fact, the dissent argued that Alvarado was never in
control over his own situation since other parties had control over
Alvarado's movements, and not Alvarado himself, at all times during this
ordeal. 199
According to the dissent, there was nothing in the law to suggest that a
judge might be prevented from taking Alvarado's juvenile status into
account.200 Supreme Court precedent indicated that a "reasonable person"
standard must be applied, but there was no indication that a reasonable
person must be a "statistically determined average person-a working,
married, 35-year old female with a high school degree."20' Conversely, the
"reasonable person" standard may appropriately account for certain
personal characteristics. 20 2 The Miranda rule had been kept as an objective
rule so as to avoid judicial inquiry into subjective states of mind.2 °3 But, it
was not intended to ignore objective circumstances known both to the
194 Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
'9' Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2152 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 2153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 2153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 2155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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officer and to the suspect, and that are relevant to the analysis of how a
person would understand his situation.0 4
Justice Breyer went on to state that youth is not a special quality, but a
widely shared characteristic that elicits general and common-sense
conclusions about adolescent behavior and perception.20 5 In this case,
Alvarado's youth was a circumstance that was known by the police prior to
the start of the interrogation.20 6 If anything, the dissent considered age to be
an objective circumstance and thought that the Court should be loathe to
ignore such widely shared characteristics "on the ground that only a (large)
minority of the population possesses them., 20 7 Furthermore, the dissent
brought to light the fact that the majority made no real argument and gave
no explanation as to why any court would believe that the objective fact of a
suspect's age could never be relevant.20 8
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court was correct in determining that the state court's
decision not to include a juvenile's age and prior experience with law
enforcement fit within the boundaries of previous Supreme Court precedent
concerning custodial determinations for the purposes of Miranda. The
inclusion of these two factors would have been an unreasonable extension
of clearly established law, even though the Supreme Court had previously
included these factors in other standards of analysis.20 9 A juvenile's age
and prior experience are material circumstances and thus the decision to
include them into the custodial determination analysis was the Supreme
Court's to make and no other.210  Looking beyond this procedural
determination, however, the Supreme Court should have admitted the
consideration of a juvenile's age into custodial determinations and was
204 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(upholding warrantless searches by school officials of students' belongings); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody."); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
210 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). A rule like this would break new
legal ground or impose new obligations on the states. Id.
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wrong to exclude it in the determination of custody for Alvarado and for all
future custodial determinations henceforth. 1 '
A. THE STATE COURT'S REFUSAL TO INCLUDE THE CONSIDERATION
OF A JUVENILE'S AGE AND PRIOR HISTORY WAS NOT AN
UNREASONABLE FAILURE TO EXTEND ESTABLISHED FEDERAL
LAW
The law possesses an undeniable elastic quality, and it is that elasticity
that permits judges to hold a certain degree of discretion in making
decisions. However, there are limits to the extent to which the law may be
stretched. In situations where the Supreme Court has set a strict and
specific rule of application as precedent, lower courts must closely follow
that directive.212 Prior to the inception of the AEDPA, federal courts were
given the authority to determine the merits of mixed questions of law and
fact, de novo.213 Hence, a federal court was not obligated to attach any
binding weight to a mixed question such as the one faced by the Supreme
Court in Yarborough v. Alvarado. However, with the enactment of the
AEDPA, federal courts were subsequently obligated to afford state
decisions a measure of deference, except in the event that a state court
unreasonably extended or unreasonably failed to extend Supreme Court
precedent.z 4 Thus, the more the governing legal directive embodies
211 While youth should be a factor in determining whether a juvenile was in custody for
Miranda purposes, a suspect's prior experience with law enforcement should not be, as it
would make the custodial determination test too subjective. Experience lends itself to being
a subjective rather than an objective consideration, since degrees of experience vary from
person to person. Moreover, the way in which an individual draws on their personal
experiences to deal with a situation is a function dependent on that individual's unique
personality.
Studies have also shown that there is no clear difference between non-offenders and
those with prior criminal offense histories in the comprehension of Miranda rights, which
leads to the belief that prior experience does not necessarily have any bearing on a person's
understanding of the interrogation process. Thomas Grisso, Juvenile's Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1156, 1166 (1980).
Additionally, knowledge about the workings of the criminal justice system can be gained not
only through personal experience, but through information gleaned from others. GEORGE W.
O'CONNOR & NELSON A. WATSON, INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY & YOUTh CPimE: THE POLICE ROLE-AN ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHY, POLICY
AND OPINION 57 (1964). This connotes that prior experience with law enforcement is not
necessarily a material nor useful consideration in the determination of custody, and would
only serve to make the custodial determination standard subjective in nature, which the
Supreme Court was seeking to avoid in Yarborough.
212 Pettys, supra note 25, at 777.




general terms, the more the range of acceptable outcomes under that
directive increases and the higher the likelihood that a federal court will
find that precedent has been unreasonably extended decreases. 21" As a
result, state court rulings are more likely to be left undisturbed.
21 6
In the case of Michael Alvarado, it is debatable as to whether the
established custodial determination inquiry is one that is so specific that an
extension of that standard would be considered unreasonable and merits
review, or if it is general enough that state courts would have the discretion
to enter new considerations (or not) into the standard. Seemingly, the
Supreme Court has basically declined to adopt bright-line rules in
determining whether a person was in custody.217 This leads to the
perception that the custodial determination inquiry is a general standard
allowing for some leeway for the state court to consider factors not
specifically specified by the Supreme Court in previous decisions.
However, the Supreme Court has found extensions of precedent
unreasonable when extending it would require courts to predict the
occurrence of future events and would provoke litigation on peripheral
matters.218 Consequently, Alvarado's habeas petition should not have been
granted.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Extrapolation of Past Supreme Court Precedent was
Unreasonable Due to the Material Nature of Juvenile Age and Experience
in Custodial Determinations and Because Such an Extension Would Have
Created a New Legal Rule
The Supreme Court has long accounted for juvenile status and has
recognized the resulting immaturity and inability of juveniles to handle
stress and decision-making in an adult-like manner.219 This understanding
of juvenile behavior has led the Court many times to award minors greater
constitutional protections or to impose more stringent limitations on certain
liberties. 220 The very nature of the juvenile's age was considered a material
circumstance that warranted a different level of inquiry or a different
215 Pettys, supra note 25, at 793.
216 id.
217 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
218 Pettys, supra note 25, at 753 (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000));
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
219 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(upholding warrantless searches by school officials of students' belongings); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody"); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
220 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 1; Haley, 332 U.S. at 596.
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outcome from that of an adult.22 1 On this basis, an extrapolation of
established precedent to include juvenile status in the determination of
custody status could be seen as being reasonable, although the issue had
never been before the Supreme Court prior to Yarborough.
22
However, permitting the inclusion of a material factor such as juvenile
status would have substantially changed the landscape of custodial
determinations and would have wrongly vested the development of this area
of the law in the California state courts, rather than with the Supreme Court.
Lower courts must refrain from making judgments on material
circumstances that would significantly alter the scope of the existing
standard, as it is outside the bounds of their authority and would result in an
unreasonable extension of established federal law.223 If the Supreme Court
has not broken sufficient legal ground to establish a clear constitutional
principle, then lower courts cannot take it upon themselves to establish such
a principle.224 Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously found that even
when a pending case was readily distinguishable from a fact-specific
Supreme Court precedent, a refusal to extend that precedent was not
objectively unreasonable.225
In addition, the very fact that different states have adopted different
stances in the debate to include juvenile age and experience demonstrates
that the Ninth Circuit's extrapolation of custodial determination inquiries to
include these two factors is not a straightforward one. 26 Since the Supreme
Court has included the consideration of juvenile status in other
determinations, it is reasonable to assume that consideration could and
should also be included in the judgment of custodial status for Miranda
purposes. Yet, if this assumption were so clear-cut and unambiguous, such
a split would not exist among the states, or even within the different levels
of the judicial system within the state. This disagreement among the states
concerning juvenile status demonstrates that this is an unsettled issue, and
the expansion of this legal directive concerning this particular factor should
be left to the Supreme Court.
221 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 1; Haley, 332 U.S. at 596.
222 See supra note 219.
223 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
224 Ides, supra note 22, at 701.
225 Id. at 718 (citing Penry II, 532 U.S. 782 (2001)).
226 Only a minority of states have adopted an approach that considers juvenile status.
These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. Maria E.
Touchet, Note, Children's Law: Investigatory Detention of Juveniles in New Mexico:
Providing Greater Protection Than Miranda Rights for Children in the Area of Police
Questioning-State of New Mexico v. Javier M, 32 N.M. L. REv. 393, 408 n.52 (2002).
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Any expansion of the existing custodial determination standard to
include juvenile status by any court other than the Supreme Court would be
inappropriate.227 First, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent in the
matter of juvenile status in this type of scenario, any rulings made by the
lower courts would result in the creation of a new rule. A case announces a
"new rule" when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
states or the federal government. 2 8 Thus, an expansion of the custodial
standard by the Ninth Circuit would require other states to also account for
a defendant's juvenile status, which only the Supreme Court has the
authority to do.229 Second, requiring state courts to anticipate extensions of
Supreme Court precedent to novel contexts would defeat the AEDPA's goal
of providing notice to the state courts of the rules they must apply, thereby
leading to a divergence on the application of the law. It would also defeat
Congress's purposes in limiting the basis for collateral attacks on holdings
articulated by the Supreme Court.230 Thus, the state court was right to apply
the custody determination as the Supreme Court had in the past-without
including Alvarado's age as a factor.
B. YOUTH SHOULD BE A FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHETHER A
JUVENILE WAS IN CUSTODY FOR THE PURPOSES OF MIRANDA
1. The Consideration of a Juvenile's Age Would Not be Burdensome on
Police Procedure
The Yarborough Court's decision not to include a juvenile's age and
experience in custodial determination inquiries was driven by the desire to
maintain the clarity and objectiveness of the test.23' To the Court, the
inclusion of such considerations would create a burden on law enforcement
officials to anticipate the frailties and idiosyncrasies of every suspect based
on the suspect's age and experience and alter the test so that the ultimate
inquiry is no longer focused on external objective indicia of arrest but on
the suspect's subjective state of mind.232 But in the quest to preserve the
clarity of the Miranda rule and to avoid placing a burdensome
inconvenience on law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court has adopted
227 Williams, 529 U.S. at 362.
228 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990).
229 Williams, 529 U.S. at 362.
230 Petitioner's Brief at 18, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004) (No. 02-
1684).
231 Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2151.
232 id.
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an oversimplified standard that completely leaves the notion of justice and
fairness for juveniles by the wayside.
The Supreme Court's Miranda decision evoked great outrage and
protest from the law enforcement community, who postulated that Miranda
would result in the large-scale release of guilty criminals. 3 Despite these
protests, law enforcement has coped well with these required warnings-
rather than dismantling the criminal justice system, Miranda has instead
aided police officers in carrying out their duties and procuring non-coerced
confessions while upholding the suspect's constitutional rights.234
Similarly, it is possible that the consideration of a suspect's age in custodial
determinations may potentially lead to an increased burden on the
procedure and process of law enforcement officers and draw their ire.
However, this burden is not so great that it would stall or greatly hinder the
administration of justice. In fact, it is the omission of age as a factor that
would create the injustice.
In excluding age in Alvarado's custody determination to maintain the
test's objectiveness, Justice Kennedy argued that such an exclusion was
justified since the inclusion of age would not further the clarity of the
Miranda rule, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer
23 5
Berkemer, according to Justice Kennedy, discounted the need to consider
age because it would require police officers to make guesses as to the
circumstances at issue before deciding how they may interrogate a
suspect.236 But, this argument is faulty and out of context. In Berkemer, the
'central issue was whether only suspects of felony offenses were entitled to
the notification of their Miranda rights.237 The Berkemer Court disagreed
and held that Miranda rights are applicable to all types of infractions of the
law, without exception.238 To apply Miranda only to felony offenses would
pose an insurmountable burden on police officers when interrogating
suspects.239  First, such an application would place an unreasonable
expectation on the police to make guesses as to the nature of the criminal
conduct at issue, since it is likely that a police officer is often unaware at the
time of arrest whether a misdemeanor or a felony was committed.24°
Second, circumstances after a crime has been committed can change so that
233 Touchet, supra note 226, at 407.
234 Id.
235 Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2151.
236 Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984)).
237 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429.
238 Id. at 434.




what was once a misdemeanor becomes a felony. 241 As a result, such an
application would ultimately require the police to predict the course of
future events.2 42 Hence, the circumstances that the Berkemer Court was
referencing are facts that may not always be known to police officers at the
time of interrogation, or facts that are susceptible to change.243
To apply Berkemer in this way to Yarborough was inappropriate since
age is a characteristic that remains constant during a police interrogation
and is an objectively knowable and easily discoverable fact. In the case of
Michael Alvarado, Detective Comstock twice demonstrated her awareness
of Alvarado's juvenile status: when she asked the parents to bring Alvarado
to the station and when she asked the parents for permission to question
Alvarado.244 Furthermore, it is also important to keep in mind that juvenile
status is not a peculiar mental or emotional condition unique to a specific
individual requiring police officers to account for that particular child's
subjective cognizance of the situation or specific vulnerabilities.245
Therefore, the inclusion of juvenile status in custody tests would not
jeopardize the objectiveness of the test.
Police consideration of a suspect's juvenile status is unlikely to be an
incredible burden on law enforcement officials. Police interrogators are
already encouraged to learn whatever information is available regarding the
suspect's background to prepare for the interrogation of a juvenile.246 Such
awareness of a juvenile suspect's background is deemed to provide
considerable assistance in the interrogation of a youthful subject.247 Law
enforcement agencies acknowledge the difference between adults and
juveniles and recommend all officers receive training in the handling of
juvenile cases.248 Many interrogation techniques, including the approach
taken by Detective Comstock in questioning Alvarado, are intentionally
designed to elicit information, and their use is recommended with
juveniles.249
241 Id. at 431.
242 id.
243 Id. at 430-32.
244 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004) (No. 02-
1684).
245 Respondent's Brief at 18, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
246 FRED INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 298 (4th ed. 2001).
247 Id.
248 O'CONNOR & WATSON, supra note 211, at 59.
249 INBAU ET AL., supra note 246, at 298-303. Detective Comstock appealed to
Alvarado's sense of truth and to being helpful to the police, and also took the strategy of
focusing on Soto's crimes rather than Alvarado's. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140,
2149-50 (2004). Other techniques that Detective Comstock used during her interview with
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Awarding greater safeguards to juveniles in the form of factoring age
into custodial determinations can be more of a benefit than a liability to the
criminal justice system. With the inclusion of age into custody tests, there
would be no burden to law enforcement, as there would be less of a need to
determine if the current interaction with a juvenile suspect amounts to a
custodial interrogation. Taking these extra precautions from the beginning
would not be terribly burdensome, especially in light of the fact that current
police procedure already encourages the consideration of a suspect's age.
250
In the long term, scarce and precious judicial resources would be preserved
with the lessening of collateral litigation such as this, where courts are
called upon to determine whether a juvenile was in custody of the police
and thus entitled to be informed of his or her Miranda rights.
2. The Differences Between Adolescents And Adults Warrants the
Consideration ofAge
The creation of the juvenile justice system was based on the premise
and understanding that juveniles are physically, mentally, and intellectually
different from adults.25' The lack of maturity and real world experience of
juveniles leads them to assess situations differently from adults and results
in an increased vulnerability.252  Adolescents also may sometimes be
unaware of risks perceived by adults or may calculate differently the
potential magnitude of a given risk. 3  Paternalistic policies and case
precedent applying differing standards for juveniles and adults exist
'because of the societal acceptance that "developmentally linked traits and
responses systematically affect the decision making of adolescents in a way
Alvarado were: presenting the interrogation as an opportunity for Alvarado to explain his
side of the story while offering reasons for the commission of the crime, placing primary
blame on other participants of the offense, and presenting or alluding to evidence that
"speaks for itself' as to the suspect's guilt. Respondent Brief at 3-4, Yarborough (No. 02-
1684). These tactics are recommended in police interrogation manuals as a means of
persuading a suspect of the futility of resisting to tell the truth. INBAU ET AL., supra, at 290-
92. Thus, Detective Comstock was using the very techniques used on suspects during
custodial interrogations, while questioning Alvarado.
250 INBAU ET AL., supra note 246, at 298-303.
251 Lisa M. Krzewinski, Note, But I Didn't Do It: Protecting the Rights of Juveniles
During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355 (2002).
252 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, PANEL ON
JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT & CONTROL 16 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001).
253 Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19




that may incline them to make choices that threaten harm to their own and
others' health, life, or welfare, to a greater extent than do adults. 254
These societal assessments of the greater vulnerabilities and
immaturity of adolescents are supported by scientific evidence. Emerging
research using magnetic resonance imaging of the brain demonstrates
cognitive and emotional differences between juveniles and adults. 5 While
juveniles process emotionally charged information in the part of the brain
responsible for instinct and gut reactions, adults process this same
information in the "rational" frontal section of the brain.256 An adolescent's
cognitive capacities may be akin to those of an adult, but other
developmental dimensions of the brain are slower to progress, resulting in
immature judgment and poor decision-making.257 Thus, juveniles may be
physiologically less capable than adults of reasoning logically in the face of
258particularly strong emotions.
Juveniles are also at a societal disadvantage in interrogation situations
because of their increased vulnerability to the coercive pressures of adult
authority figures.259 Children and juveniles are taught to answer questions
directed to them by adults.26 ° Most adolescents have the understanding that
they are expected to respond to the police and that they do not have much
choice in the matter.261 A study conducted by King and Yuille found that
when a status differential existed in the interview context, lower status
individuals were more likely to defer to the authority of higher status
individuals.262 Being that police officers possess a higher status than
regular adults, the status gap between juveniles and police officers is even
wider than the gap between a juvenile and an ordinary adult, thereby
making juveniles feel even more vulnerable in an interrogation situation.
Additionally, juveniles tend to undergo feelings of intense self-
consciousness which lead them to believe that others are constantly
watching and evaluating them.263 Youth have less experience, including
254 Id. at 227.
255 NAT'L REs. CouNcIL, supra note 252, at 16.
256 id.
257 Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a
Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REv. 207, 236-37(2003).
258 NAT'L REs. COuNcIL, supra note 252, at 16.
259 Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections




263 David Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 CHILD. DEv. 1025, 1029-30 (1967).
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interpersonal experiences, to draw on than adults, and so on average they
will have a lesser capacity to respond and react in new and stressful
264situations. Even more compelling, studies have shown that minors are
especially vulnerable to interrogative pressure, as measured by the tendency
to change previous answers following negative feedback, validating the
notion that minors are at risk of succumbing to the will of the interrogator
in high-pressure and extended interviews. 265  Therefore, a reasonable
juvenile would likely feel the scrutiny of the police in an already high
pressure situation even more intensely than an adult.
Existing laws and Supreme Court precedent also acknowledge the
difference between adolescents and adults.266 Juveniles are prohibited from
certain activities because of their age. Minors under the age of eighteen are
deprived of the right to vote, to drink alcoholic beverages, to marry, to buy
pornography, to gamble, or to enter into contracts, among other activities.
Arguably, such policies are in place because of a societal acknowledgment
of a minor's diminished capacity to understand and process information, to
engage in logical reasoning, and to control their impulses, among other
things.267 These characteristics of youth which compel society to apply
differing standards of treatment to juveniles also justify the need for the
consideration of age in custodial determinations and the administration of
justice.
Laws that prohibit certain activities for a portion of the population
based solely on age are able to remain objective and workable through the
'strict adherence to the set age limit. Thus, regardless of Alvarado's
proximity to his eighteenth birthday, Alvarado was still considered a
juvenile in the eyes of the law. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor raised
the issue that Alvarado was not truly a juvenile, since he was actually
264 LAURENCE STEINBERG & ROBERT SCHWARTZ, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY GOES TO
COURT IN YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 26
(Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000).
265 THE CAL. SCH. OF PROF'L PSYCHOL., HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
68 (Neil G. Ribner ed., 2002) (citing a study of sixty-five juveniles by Richardon,
Gudjonsson, and Kelly in 1995).
266 Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7,
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004) (No. 02-1684). For example, the Supreme
Court has upheld state statutes that restrict the sale of obscene material to minors, Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968), and has made legal distinctions between adolescents
and adults involving abortion rights, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Furthermore,
"state legislatures have enacted laws establishing minimum ages for a wide range of life's
activities, including marriage, driving, purchasing alcoholic beverages, and compulsory
school attendance." Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 14, Yarborough (No. 02-1684).
267 Fagan, supra note 257, at 235-36.
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seventeen years and six months old.268 In her opinion, because Alvarado
was so close to his eighteenth birthday, he was rightly treated as an adult.269
Admittedly, Alvarado was indeed very close to what is considered the
societal standard of the age of maturation. But laws that impose age
minimums do not become any more lenient the closer a minor is to his
eighteenth birthday. A seventeen-and-a-half-year-old will not be allowed to
vote or buy cigarettes until the very day of his eighteenth birthday, nor will
a twenty-and-a-half-year-old be given the leniency to gamble or drink
alcohol. Allowing reasoning such as that of Justice O'Connor would lead
the Court down a slippery slope. Law enforcement and the courts would be
left scratching their heads, trying to determine the point at which a juvenile
can legally be considered an adult. It would introduce subjective opinion
into custodial determinations, as police officers would need to ascertain if
the juvenile at issue behaves in an adult-like manner or like a normal
adolescent. Thus, the fact that Alvarado was six months shy of his
eighteenth birthday should not be the reason as to why his juvenile status
was not considered in determining whether he was in custody.
Age should be a consideration in custodial determinations, because it
affects the way an individual perceives his current surroundings, and
because age affects and influences other factors considered important to the
determination of custody.270 For example, the Supreme Court in prior
custody status cases has looked to factors such as the voluntariness of a
suspect's appearance at a police station.271 The underage status of a suspect
can affect the issue of whether a suspect's appearance at a police station is
voluntary, since juveniles are usually in the custody of their parents or an
adult caretaker. Thus an adolescent's appearance cannot be considered
wholly voluntary if he was forced to be there by his guardians. The issue of
Alvarado's minor status is consistently evident, from the fact that at no
point was Alvarado wholly in control of his movements. Detective
Comstock contacted the parents instead of Alvarado himself, and Alvarado
was brought to the police station in the custody of his parents.272 Upon his
arrival, the detective asked Alvarado's parents-not Alvarado-for
permission to interview Alvarado.273 When Alvarado's parents requested
admission into their son's interview, they were rebuffed, as was Alvarado's
268 Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
269 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
270 Kaban & Tobey, supra note 259, at 151.
271 See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
429, 493 (1977).




similar request.274 These facts tend to demonstrate that Alvarado was never
in control of his own situation, and that his custody was transferred over
from his parents to Detective Comstock. This is an issue that would not
typically arise when considering the custodial status of an adult suspect; it
highlights the significant effect age has on the factors that are analyzed to
determine an individual's custodial status for Miranda purposes.
3. Adolescents Should be Judged Against a "Reasonable Adolescent"
Standard Rather Than a "Reasonable Person" Standard
Miranda warnings and the "in custody" determination test were
created with adults in mind. Miranda mandates law enforcement to inform
suspects of constitutional privileges which were initially awarded only to
adults. It was not until In re Gault that juveniles were awarded these same
constitutional rights.275 Similarly, the standard for determining custody
status and the development of the reasonable person standard was enacted
with the adult offender in mind.276 By applying the reasonable person
standard to Alvarado's situation, the court was applying an adult standard to
a juvenile. Given the marked differences in maturity between adults and
juveniles and a sure difference in the perception of surroundings, it seems
illogical to apply the same standard to both adults and juveniles alike. By
virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in this case, lower courts in
subsequent cases will be required to apply this reasonable person standard,
which was developed with the adult suspect in mind, to all juveniles.
Regardless of whether these minors are ten or seventeen, the determination
of whether these juveniles were in custody will be made based on the
standard of a reasonable 'person', or in actuality a reasonable adult.
Even the majority in Yarborough stated that it is possible to subsume a
subjective factor into an objective test by making that factor more specific
in its formulation.277 It also failed to state a concrete reason in disallowing
a reasonable adolescent standard given the evidence supporting the
differences between adults and adolescents. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
appropriately styled its inquiry of custody for the purposes of Miranda as
274 Id.
275 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
276 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318
(1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977).
277 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct 2140, 2151 (2004).
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an objective test by considering what a reasonable seventeen year old with
no prior history of arrest or police interviews would perceive.21 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Existing Supreme Court precedent concerning custodial
determinations for Miranda purposes had never before addressed the issue
of juvenile age and prior history with law enforcement. Coupled with the
material nature of these factors, the Supreme Court was correct in its ruling
that the state's refusal to extend precedent to include age and history in
custodial determinations was not objectively unreasonable. The decision to
include or exclude the consideration of age and a suspect's criminal history
is only the responsibility of the Supreme Court.
However, on the substantive matter of whether a juvenile's age should
be included in the custodial inquiry, the Court was wrong to conclude that
juvenile status should not be a consideration. The Supreme Court and
society at large have long recognized a cognitive and physiological
difference between adults and adolescents that warrants the disparate
treatment of the two groups. The Supreme Court's fears that the
consideration of a juvenile's age would change the custodial determination
inquiry into a subjective test and would result in an insurmountable burden
to law enforcement are unfounded. Age is not a characteristic unique only
to certain individuals, and its inclusion would not lessen the objectiveness
of the custodial analysis. Moreover, police procedures already take juvenile
status into account to help them in the interrogation process. In the absence
of a supportable basis for rejecting the consideration of age into custodial
determinations, and evidence demonstrating a societal and legal
differentiation between adults and juveniles, the Supreme Court was wrong
to exclude juvenile status in Alvarado's custody determination, and for all
future custody determinations.
Jennifer Park
278 Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2003).
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